Detention, Material Witnesses & (and) the War on Terrorism by Levenson, Laurie L.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-2002
Detention, Material Witnesses & (and) the War on
Terrorism
Laurie L. Levenson
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laurie L. Levenson, Detention, Material Witnesses & (and) the War on Terrorism, 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1217 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol35/iss4/3
ESSAY
DETENTION, MATERIAL WITNESSES & THE
WAR ON TERRORISM
Laurie L. Levenson*
Fifteen years ago, Justice Thurgood Marshall warned in his
dissent in United States v. Salerno' that we are quickly moving to a
criminal justice system where "a person innocent of any crime may
be jailed indefinitely." 2  The issue in Salerno was the
constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 that authorized
detention of defendants who pose a pretrial danger to the
community.3 At the time it was adopted, the new law caused quite a
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School,
Los Angeles. My thanks to the Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review for hosting
this symposium on Terrorism and the Law, and to my terrific research
assistant, Dennis Hyun, for all his help in preparing this Essay. Special thanks
to James Gilliam for all his editorial assistance.
1. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
2. Id. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote:
This case brings before the Court for the first time a statute in
which Congress declares that a person innocent of any crime may be
jailed indefinitely, pending the trial of allegations which are legally
presumed to be untrue, if the Government shows to the satisfaction of
a judge that the accused is likely to commit crimes, unrelated to the
pending charges, at any time in the future. Such statutes, consistent
with the usages of tyranny and the excesses of what bitter experience
teaches us to call the police state, have long been thought incompatible
with the fundamental human rights protected by our Constitution.
Today a majority of this Court holds otherwise. Its decision
disregards basic principles of justice established centuries ago and
enshrined beyond the reach of governmental interference in the Bill of
Rights.
Id. at 755-56.
3. Seeid. at741.
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stir.4 Defendants were to be presumed innocent and bail was to be
determined based upon flight risk.5
When the majority in Salerno held that prospective danger to the
community could be used as a criterion for denying bail, 6 it
fundamentally changed how the criminal justice system views
detention-a change that reverberates in the War on Terrorism today.
Up to that time, there had been a presumption that a defendant
should not be prejudged as a threat to security. Salerno altered that.
We moved into an era in which there might technically be a
presumption of innocence, but there are a host of criminal and civil
laws that allow the government to detain individuals because it
suspects they could cause future harm.
7
When Salerno was first announced, there was strong public
reaction. Editorials in three major newspapers condemned the
decision. The Los Angeles Times wrote:
The purpose of ball is to make sure that an accused
person will appear at trial while not keeping him in jail
before he is convicted. It is a perversion of the system to
use bail to keep people in jail without trial. If there is a
4. The Salerno decision prompted a series of commentaries criticizing the
move toward preventive detention. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive
Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due
Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510 (1986); Floralynn Einesman, How Long is Too
Long? When Pretrial Detention Violates Due Process, 60 TENN. L. REV. 1
(1992); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and
Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335 (1990); Kevin F. Arthur, Comment,
Preventive Detention: Liberty in the Balance, 46 MD. L. REV. 378 (1987);
Michael J. Eason, Case Note, Eighth Amendment-Pretrial Detention: What
Will Become of the Innocent?, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1048 (1988);
Margaret S. Gain, Note, The Bail Reform Act of 1984 and United States v.
Salerno: Too Easy to Believe, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1371 (1988-89); Scott
D. Himsell, Comment, Preventive Detention: A Constitutional but Ineffective
Means of Fighting Pretrial Crime, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439 (1986);
Marian E. Lupo, Comment, United States v. Salerno: "A Loaded Weapon
Ready for the Hand," 54 BROOK. L. REV. 171 (1988); Donald W. Price, Note,
Crime and "Regulation": United States v. Salerno, 48 LA. L. REV. 743 (1988);
M. Gray Styers, Jr., Note, United States v. Salerno: Pretrial Detention Seen
Through the Looking Glass, 66 N.C. L. REV. 616 (1988); John A. Washington,
Note, Preventive Detention: Dangerous Until Proven Innocent, 38 CATH. U. L.
REV. 271 (1988).
5. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742.
6. See id. at 748-49.
7. See id.
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The War on Terrorism has capitalized on this new attitude.
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Justice Department
and the courts had little hesitancy in detaining individuals who have
been prejudged as dangerous. In the rush to shore up national
security, the government detained thousands of people. Some were
alleged to be in violation of the immigration laws; others were
designated as "material witnesses."
Of the hundreds of aliens who were rounded up on immigration
violations, 12 none have been directly linked to the terrorist attacks of
September 11. However, the admitted purpose of the roundup was
preventive detention. During Congressional hearings, Senator Sam
Brownback, a ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Immigration
Subcommittee stated, "Clearly, clearly, our immigration laws and
policies are instrumental to the war on terrorism. While a battle may
be waged on many fronts, for the man or woman on the streets
immigration is the front line."'
13
One of the sad consequences of the War on Terrorism is that it
set back advances that had been recently made on behalf of detained
immigrants. 14 Just a few months before the September 11 attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States Supreme
Court held in Zadvydas v. Davis15 that indefinite detention of
removable aliens violates due process.' 6 Conversely, by October 26,
12. Six months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 563
individuals detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service remained
in custody. See The Dept. of Justice and Terrorism: Hearing of the S.
Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 36 (2001).
13. Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Border Controls: S. Judiciary Immigration
Subcomm., 107th Cong. (2001) (FDCH Political Transcripts).
14. See Ashcroft Warns More Terrorist Attacks Likely, Urges Passage of
Anti-Terrorism Measures, THE BULLETIN'S FRoNTRUNNER, Oct. 1, 2001
("Before September 11, the 'push in Washington was to restrict the powers of
immigration authorities, not extend them. Courts, legislators and even
President Bush had criticized federal agents about their use of classified or
secret evidence, called 'poisonous' by one judge and 'obnoxious' by
another."').
15. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
16. See id. at 689. See generally Daniel Kanstroom, United States
Immigration Policy at the Millennium-Deportation, Social Control, and
Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1889 (2000) (explaining how to best understand the
constitutional doctrine of deportation law); Kevin Costello, Comment, Without
a Country: Indefinite Detention as Constitutional Purgatory, 3 U. PA. J.
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case to be made against someone, let the government make
it. If not, "preventive detention" should not be used as a
substitute.
8
Similarly, Stephen Chapman of the Chicago Tribune
proclaimed, "'[i]nnocent until proven guilty' is one of those axioms
so basic to the American way that it can be repeated by every
schoolchild. So when the Supreme Court does violence to the
concept.., the damage ought to evoke alarm."9 Finally, the New
York Times editors opined:
Who is hurt by this decision, other than thugs like
Anthony (Fat Tony) Salerno... ?
But [he's] not the only onef. "Lock him up," today's
prosecutor may urge. "There's danger of violence." The
sharper danger is that tomorrow's prosecutor will find it
easier to "regulate" other defendants, who harbor unpopular
ideas. In defending the rights of unsavory citizens, we
defend our own. In restricting them, the Court demeans
liberty.'
0
Attitudes have changed. Following Salerno, the public and the
courts predictably moved into an era in which we are relatively
comfortable with preventive detention. Legally, there may still be
the presumption that a defendant is innocent, but we have many more
laws today that permit the preventive detention of individuals in the
name of guaranteeing society's security.11
8. Throwing Away the Key, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1987, at Metro 4.
9. Stephen Chapman, The Court Bails Out of Its Obligation to Shield the
Innocent, CI. TRIB., May 31, 1987, at 3.
10. Dangerous Until Proved Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1987, at A22.
11. The movement toward additional detention has also resulted in the
increased civil commitment of persons deemed to have a dangerous mental
condition after they have completed their criminal sentences. See Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). See generally Paul H. Robinson, Punishing
Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114
HARV. L. REv. 1429 (2001) (concluding that the criminal justice system's shift
toward detaining dangerous offenders is a "move in the wrong direction");
Carol S. Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998) (calling for a more general discussion of the limits
of the preventive state); Kimberly A. Dorsett, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks:
Marking the Beginning of a Dangerous New Era in Civil Commitment, 48
DEPAUL L. REv. 113 (1998) (criticizing the Supreme Court's justifications for
upholding a law authorizing the indefinite detention of sexual offenders).
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individual available to testify in a criminal proceeding. Although
they were being detained, material witnesses were conceptually
different from defendants who were incarcerated. Material witnesses
were to be held because they could assist the criminal justice system
in convicting those who pose a danger; they themselves were not
considered a threat.
24
With the War on Terrorism, the legal seas have changed. The
designation of material witness has often become a temporary
moniker to identify an individual who will soon bear the status of
defendant. Consider, for example, the initial designation of Terry
Lynn Nichols as a material witness in the bombing of the Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City.25 When Nichols challenged the
material witness warrant, the authorities simply substituted it with a
criminal complaint charging malicious destruction of government
26thproperty. Given the breadth of our conspiracy laws, it is not
difficult to find a sufficient link to charge a person who has intimate
knowledge regarding a crime as a co-conspirator to that crime.
Similarly, it has not been difficult for prosecutors in terrorism
cases to convert material witnesses into defendants. One standard
technique is to question the witness before the grand jury, knowing
that the individual is unlikely to cooperate fully. When the detainee
withholds information or lies to the grand jury, charges of perjury or
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of
a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it
may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by
subpena [sic], a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person and
[order him detained].
18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1984).
24. In fact, to encourage individuals to be more cooperative as material
witnesses, the courts provide for alternatives to incarceration, such as the
deposition of material witnesses so they may be released. See Ronald L.
Carlson & Mark S. Voelpel, Material Witness and Material Injustice, 58
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 39-40 (1980); see also Lisa Chanow Dykstra, The
Application of Material Witness Provisions: A Case Study--Are Homeless
Material Witnesses Entitled to Due Process and Representation by Counsel?,
36 ViLL. L. REV. 597, 634-46 (1991) (discussing protections for homeless
material witnesses).
25. See In re Material Witness Warrant (Nichols), 77 F.3d 1277, 1279 (10th
Cir. 1996) (striking down a challenge to a material witness warrant because it
became moot when criminal' charges were filed).
26. See id.
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obstruction of justice can be substituted for the material witness
warrant.
27
Until recently, courts have permitted this troubling investigative
tactic.28 However, the courts' attitudes may be changing. On April
30, 2002, United States District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin in New
York upheld a challenge to the material witness laws used to hold
individuals for grand jury investigations. In United States v.
Awadallah,29 the court struck down the use of the federal material
witness laws to detain a college student whom prosecutors believed
had information regarding the September 11 attacks.30 According to
Judge Scheindlin, the material witness statute should be limited to
only "criminal proceedings," which do not include grand jury
investigations. As Judge Scheindlin stated, Osama Awadallah, was
imprisoned as a high security inmate3' and "having committed no
crime-indeed, without any claim that there was probable cause to
believe he had violated the law," he "bore the full weight of a prison
27. See, e.g.,In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Ali, No. M 11-188 (RPP), 1999
WL 595665 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1999) (denying a detainee's motion to
vacate a civil contempt order issued after his refusal to testify before the May
1999 Special Grand Jury convened to investigate the bombings of the United
States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania).
28. The tactic is commonly known as a "pejury trap" and was used in 1999
during the investigation of the bombings of the Kenyan and Tanzanian
embassies. See id. at *2.
29. 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
30. Awadallah was arrested on September 21, 2001, after his college
professor noted that Awadallah had stated in his examination booklet that
"Nawaf' and "Khalid," the names of two of the September 11 hijackers, were
the quietest people he had ever met. In the grand jury, Awadallah admitted
knowing one of the hijackers but not the other. However, he returned to the
grand jury a few days later to admit that he knew both. Nonetheless,
prosecutors charged him with two counts of perjury before the grand jury. See
Mark Hamblett, Material Witnesses' Detention Narrowed, at
http://www.law.com (May 1, 2002); Jess Bravin, et al., Judge Rules Against
Imprisoning People to Help Investigations, L.A. DAILY J., May 2, 2002, at A4.
31. According to Awadallah's counsel, Awadallah was subject to constant
verbal and physical abuse while in custody at the Metropolitan Correctional
Center in South Manhattan. Additionally, he was subjected to videotaped strip
searches and denied basic prison privileges, such as family visits, mall,
television, writing material, most reading materials, and sometimes access to
his counsel. See Randall B. Hamud, Diary of a Terrorist's Lawyer, CAL. LAW.
20 (Apr. 2002) (describing the abusive prosecutorial tactics and difficult
conditions under which Awadallah and his co-detainees were detained).
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2001, Congress had provided a legislative mechanism for lengthy
detention of aliens. Under the new USA PATRIOT Act,17 if the
Attorney General designates an alien as a terrorist threat, that
individual may be held for repeated six-month periods with no limit
on the number of times such a designation may be made. 18 Thus, we
have become so comfortable with the concept of preventive
detention that we now allow it based upon the certification of the
Attorney General, rather than court order.
The War on Terrorism also has made a fundamental change in
the use of material witness laws. Under the material witness laws,
individuals who have not committed any crime themselves may
nonetheless be detained for extended periods of time.19 They stand
in legal limbo. As alleged witnesses to other people's crimes, they
can be detained until after the criminal justice system is done with
them. They are subject to deprivations of their liberty, even though
they have not committed a crime. They are detained because, even
though they may not be a risk to society, they know about someone
else who may be. They are held because it strategically benefits the
government to have them in custody.20
CONST. L. 503 (2001) (arguing that indefinite detention of removable criminal
aliens with little chance of deportation violates the Constitution); Clay
McCaslin, Comment, "My Jailor is My Judge": Kestutis Zadvydas and the
Indefinite Imprisonment of Permanent Resident Aliens by the INS, 75 TUL. L.
REV. 193 (2000) (considering the consitutional issues presented by the
Zadvydas case).
17. 107 H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
18. See id. at § 412.
19. See generally Laurie L. Levenson, Material Witnesses, NAT'L L.J., B 11
(Nov. 5, 2001) (indicating the detainee can be held as long as there is probable
cause that he or she has material evidence regarding a criminal offense). For
more information regarding material witnesses and their rights, see Susan
Kling, Note, A Mandatory Right to Counsel for the Material Witness, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 473 (1986).
20. In her article, Un-American Activities: Racial Profiling and the
Backlash After Sept. 11, Farah Brelvi reported that the Washington Post quoted
a senior federal law enforcement official involved in the investigation, and he
stated on condition of anonymity that "the detention of these 'material
witnesses' is 'pushing the envelope' of civil liberties." Witnesses are detained
for weeks or longer if they have any affiliation with suspected terrorists. Farah
S. Brelvi, Un-American Activities: Racial Profiling and the Backlash After
Sept. 11, 48 FED. LAW. 69, 73 (Nov./Dec. 2001).
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The designation of material witnesses dates back to Common
Law.2 1 The original concept was that individuals who have relevant
testimony regarding a case have a responsibility to appear as
witnesses. As Lord Bacon declared, "'[a]ll subjects, without
distinction of degrees, owe to the King tribute and service, not only
of their deed and hand, but of their knowledge and discovery."' 22 It
was never conceived, however, as a means to detain those whom the
authorities suspected of being a threat to society but did not have
enough evidence to charge.
When America adopted into its laws the power to detain
material witnesses,23 the focus of the law was on having an
21. See generally Stacey M. Studnicki, Material Witness Detention: Justice
Served or Denied?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1533, 1534-36 (1994) (explaining that
the notion of the material witness began in the 1500's in England).
22. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1919) (quoting the
Countess of Shrewsbury's case, 2 How. St. Tr. 769, 778 (1612)).
23. The First Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the detention of material
witnesses. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 30, 33, 1 Stat. 23, 88-91
(1850). This Act provided in pertinent part:
[C]opies of the process [against the accused] shall be returned as
speedily as may be into the clerk's office of such court, together with
the recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify in the
case; which recognizances the magistrate before whom the
examination shall be, may require on pain of imprisonment.
Id. at § 33.
In 1946, when the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted,
the federal laws regarding material witnesses were repealed and authorization
for their detention was tied to Rule 46(b) of the Federal Rules. Until 1972 it
read as follows:
If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material
in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become
impracticable to secure his presence by subpoena, the court or
commissioner may require him to give bail for his appearance as a
witness, in an amount fixed by the court or commissioner. If the
person fails to give bail, the court or commissioner may commit him
to the custody of the marshall pending final disposition of the
proceeding in which the testimony is needed, may order his release if
he has been detained for an unreasonable length of time and may
modify at any time the requirement of bail.
Susan Kling, Note, A Mandatory Right to Counsel for the Material Witness, 19
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 473 n.23 (1986).
Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, adopted in 1984 as part of the Bail Reform
Act, now contains the primary provisions regarding material witnesses. It
states:
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system designed to punish convicted criminals as well as incapacitate
individuals arrested or indicted for criminal conduct."
32
Material witness laws provide the government with the perfect
avenue to jail those it considers dangerous. It is preventive
detention. Despite Judge Scheindlin's ruling, the Attorney General
has indicated he still considers material witness warrants as a viable
investigative tool.33 The government uses these laws to round up
people because of what it expects them to do, rather than what it can
prove they have done.
The groundwork for using material witness warrants to effect
preventive detention was laid in the Salerno decision. Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist proclaimed:
[T]he Government's regulatory interest in community
safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an
individual's liberty interest. For example, in times of war
or insurrection, when society's interest is at its peak, the
Government may detain individuals whom the Government
believes to be dangerous. Even outside the exigencies of
war, we have found that sufficiently compelling
governmental interests can justify detention of dangerous
persons.
34
These words have become a justification for the aggressive use
of both the immigration laws and material witness warrants to detain
individuals suspected of, but not charged with, terrorist acts and
sympathies. In the name of security, we have pushed the legal
envelope by using laws that were created for other purposes to assist
in detaining perceived enemies.
It is time to pause again to consider the dangers in this approach.
Certainly, national security is a legitimate goal. The events of
September 11 must never be repeated. But, as the road from Salerno
has demonstrated, it is hard to regain support for freedoms once they
are compromised. In his lengthy dissent in Salerno, Justice Marshall
quoted Chief Justice Robert Jackson from another era,35 whom,
thirty-five years before Salerno, had reviewed the pleas for bail on
appeal by members of the American Communist Party:
32. Hamblett, supra note 30, at 2.
33. See id.
34. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (citations omitted).
35. See id. at 766 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Grave public danger is said to result from what [the
defendants] may be expected to do, in addition to what they
have done .... If I assume that defendants are disposed to
commit every opportune disloyal act helpful to Communist
countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with traditional
American law the jailing of persons by the courts because
of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes.
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but
unconsummated offenses is... unprecedented in this
country and... fraught with danger of excesses and
injustice .... 36
However, imprisonment to protect society is not unprecedented.
In fact, quite the contrary is true. As history demonstrates, there
certainly is a domino effect. Laws supporting preventive detention
pending appeal ultimately lead to laws supporting preventive
detention pending trial. Those laws then lead to the increased use of
laws for civil commitment, additional use of laws to detain aliens,
and the aggressive use of the laws to detain material witnesses. As
this trend demonstrates, we are well on our way to making
preventive detention the norm, rather than the exception.
It is understandable that during a time of crisis society wants to
take all possible steps to protect itself. However, we would be wise
to heed Justice Marshall's warning: "the coercive power of authority
to imprison upon prediction... [poses a danger] to the cherished
liberties of a free society."37 If the government fears that illegal
aliens are terrorists, then it should hold deportation hearings and
deport them. If it feels that individuals designated as material
witnesses are disguised terrorists, then it should charge them and try
them as terrorists. Do not, however, simply expand the use of
preventive detention to accomplish the same goals. Otherwise, the
dangerous trend set today is likely to continue for years to come.
36. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Williamson v. United States, 184
F.2d 280, 282-83 (1950) (footnotes omitted)).
37. Id. at 766-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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